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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ATTENTIONAL COMPETITION: WEAPON FOCUS, ENCODING TIME, AND 
MEMORY ACCURACY CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CRIME SCENE ITEMS  
by 
Seyram Mawuko Kekessie 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Steve Charman, Major Professor 
The present study develops a theoretical model of attention to examine the 
relationships between memory for faces and memory for objects within an eyewitness 
context. 713 participants watched an image that was either displayed for five seconds or 
twenty seconds, and either included a weapon or no weapon. Subsequently, they were 
asked to give descriptions of what they saw before viewing a series of person and object 
lineups that either included the targets or not. Generally consistent with the proposed 
attentional model, several results were found: (a) witnesses’ description accuracy of the 
crime scene had little or no predictive abilities with regards to their facial identification 
accuracy; (b) a weapon focus effect was found for faces but not for objects; (c) this 
weapon focus effect was eliminated among witnesses who had long encoding times; and 
(d) increased encoding time improved recognition of objects, but not faces. Results 
suggest that prior inaccuracy on one aspect of testimony is not necessarily indicative of 
subsequent inaccuracy on another aspect of testimony. The findings advance a model of 
attention that is able to account for various disparate empirical findings.  
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Introduction 
Consider the story of Steve, who decided one afternoon on his way home to 
purchase some snacks from a convenience store in his neighborhood. He paid for his 
items and proceeded to the exit, just as another man made his way into the store. Upon 
entering, the man ordered the store clerk at gunpoint to hand over all the money in the 
cash register. The store clerk obliged and emptied the contents of the cash register. The 
man then rushed out of the store and into a waiting car, which fled the scene. Soon 
afterwards, the police arrived at the scene and began investigating. Based on information 
gathered from witnesses, the police were able to arrest a suspect a few days later. Steve 
was one of the witnesses interviewed by the police and he was called to the witness box 
to testify in court. During cross-examination, the defense attorney asked him if he 
recalled what he told the police about the color of the vehicle the suspect used to escape. 
He responded that it was a green car. At this point, the defense attorney introduced 
security camera footage evidence showing the car in question. Scrutiny of the footage 
revealed that the vehicle was in fact blue, and not green as indicated by Steve to the 
police and the court. Does Steve’s inaccuracy about the color of the vehicle render him 
unreliable as a witness? Does his inaccuracy mean that other parts of his testimony 
cannot be trusted? Is his credibility as a witness undermined? These are all questions that 
the present study will examine. The objectives of the present study are threefold: (a) to 
examine the relationships between recognition and recall accuracy of faces, and 
recognition and recall accuracy of objects; (b) to examine whether these relationships are 
influenced by the amount of time available to a witness for encoding information; and (c) 
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to examine the influence of the presence of a weapon on memory processing and 
accuracy. To address these questions, a novel theoretical model of eyewitness attention is 
proposed that ties together these research questions. 
A key tenet of an ideal legal system is to render fair and accurate decisions 
regarding the guilt or innocence of the people who stand accused before a court. 
Consequently, one of the most important roles of a judge or a juror is to determine 
whether or not a court witness is being truthful. Indeed, this role is a core component in 
assessing the credibility of a witness, which may ultimately influence the judge or juror’s 
final verdict (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009).  
During a trial, an attorney’s main goal is ultimately to persuade the jury or judge 
to accept his or her version of the facts (Dial & Ellis, 2010). One way this can be done is 
through the testimony of witnesses, which entails calling a witness to the stand, through 
whom the attorney’s theory of the case is presented. Another tactic entails attacking or 
undermining the credibility of an opposing witness via cross-examination. One of the 
most common ways a witness’ credibility can be undermined during cross-examination is 
by exposing prior inconsistent or inaccurate information, and using that as a basis to 
disparage the value of any subsequent information provided by the witness. Indeed, it is 
common practice for an attorney during cross-examination to for instance retort to a 
witness: “since you were inaccurate about the color of the suspect’s getaway vehicle, why 
should we believe your facial identification of the suspect in a lineup?” There is ample 
evidence to suggest that this tactic has been quite effective in many cases (Dial & Ellis, 
2010). At issue is not necessarily whether the tactic is effective, but rather whether it is 
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true. More specifically, are inaccuracies with respect to recall memory for objects related 
to inaccurate facial lineup identifications?  
Previous literature suggests that we have a default tendency to believe a witness is 
accurate and truthful unless there is a compelling reason as to why the witness’ testimony 
should not be trusted (Fisher, Vrij & Leins, 2010; Gilbert, 1991). In instances where we 
do not have adequate and relevant knowledge about an event, we tend to rely on factors 
such as the witness’s confidence and the consistency of his or her statements as indicators 
of reliability (Fisher, Vrij & Leins, 2010). In some instances however, there is adequate 
relevant background knowledge about an event, which allows us to objectively assess the 
accuracy or veracity of a witness’ account. For instance, the security camera footage from 
a crime scene can help investigators objectively ascertain the accuracy of a witness’ 
recollection of a particular crime scene detail. Therefore, a witness who identifies the 
color of a get-away vehicle as green can be judged to be inaccurate if the security video 
footage shows that the car was in fact blue.  
For the purposes of the present study, I examine the relationship between 
accuracy on one set of items (i.e., non-facial object information) and the accuracy on 
another set of items (i.e., facial identification information). In simple terms, does recall or 
recognition accuracy on non-face items predict facial identification accuracy? 
Additionally, accuracy may be influenced by the retrieval memory processes involved in 
recall and recognition. 
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Recall and Recognition Memory in the Eyewitness Literature 
Our ability to remember events, people, or objects relies in large part on the 
mental processes of recall and recognition. Although quite inter-dependent under certain 
circumstances, the processes of recall and recognition are different at a basic level. 
Whereas recall demands the retrieval of specific, contextual details of a past encounter, 
recognition relies more on a subjective sense of previously encountered details of a past 
encounter (Hollingworth, 1913).  
A number of studies have compared recall and recognition memory performance 
on varying tasks. For instance, some prior studies (e.g., Freund, Brelsford, & Atkinson, 
1969) have shown that when examining scores, recognition memory can be generally 
superior to recall memory. The superiority of recognition over recall is assumed to be due 
to the differences in the processes during the time of retrieval (Loftus, 1971). 
Specifically, the probability of guessing the right answer is usually higher in recognition 
than it is with recall. Indeed, it is plausible that the type of information needed for 
recognition versus recall means that there are different control processes involved for 
recall and recognition. For instance, with regards to recognition, it is likely possible to 
generate a correct response with very minimal information about the memory or the 
target (Loftus, 1971). For example, if the subject can simply remember that the answer to 
a given question is the name of an animal, s/he is likely to guess correctly if presented 
with the response option “table” and asked to respond “yes or no.” This strategy of course 
fails when asked to simply recall the answer.  
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Some studies have however shown that there are certain circumstances under 
which recall can be superior to recognition. Specifically, storage processing differences 
may account for differences in recognition-recall performance. In one study, Loftus 
(1971) randomly assigned participants to four conditions prior to being given either a 
recall or recognition test. In one condition, participants were presented with stimulus 
material to study, and were told that they would later be tested on their memory for that 
material with a recall task. In another condition, participants were presented with the 
stimulus material and told that they would later be tested on their memory for that 
material with a recognition test. In the third condition, participants were presented with 
the stimulus material and were only told they would be tested, without being told the 
specific type of test they would be given. Finally, in the fourth condition, participants 
were given no information about being tested. Results indicated that subjects who knew 
they would be tested performed better on recall but worse on recognition than those who 
were not told they would be tested. Loftus interpreted these results as support for the 
assertion that storage processing differences account for differences in recall-recognition 
performance. 
Recall versus Recognition within an Eyewitness Context 
During crime investigations, investigators routinely interview eyewitnesses to 
gather details about the crime, and to generate leads that can result in the apprehension of 
a suspect. These interviews are typically only useful to the extent that the witness can 
reliably recollect details related to the crime from memory. The recollection of crime 
details are driven in large part by the memory processes of recall and recognition. For 
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instance, a witness’s initial description of the perpetrator would rely on the process of 
recall, whereas a witness’s identification of the perpetrator from a lineup would rely on 
the process of recognition (Ellis, 1984; Tversky, 1973). Thus, the role of recall and 
recognition processes cannot be overstated in terms of importance to the work of law 
enforcement officials.  
Researchers on eyewitness memory have over the years examined the influence of 
recall and recognition processes on eyewitnesses’ ability to provide accurate accounts of 
witnessed events. For instance, a plethora of previous research has attempted to examine 
the relationship between verbal descriptions of suspects and facial recognition (Chance & 
Goldstein, 1976; Goldstein & Chance, 1971; Meissner, Brigham, & Kelley, 2001; Pigott 
& Brigham, 1985; Wells, 1985). Indeed, it is standard procedure for police investigators 
to request a thorough description of a crime perpetrator shortly after a crime, in order to 
assist in their investigation to identify and apprehend the suspect. Much of the research 
on this topic has focused on examining whether verbal descriptions of a perpetrator 
provided by a witness (a product of recall) can predict subsequent identification of a 
suspect from a lineup (a product of recognition).  
Much of the earlier research on the description-identification relationship revealed 
that the accuracy with which a face was described was not related to the accuracy of 
facial identification. For instance, Pigott and Brigham (1985) briefly exposed participants 
to a target person whose physical characteristics they were later asked to describe. They 
were then subsequently asked to identify the target person from a lineup in which he was 
either present or not present. The results showed no relationship between description 
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accuracy and identification accuracy. In another study by Chance and Goldstein (1976), 
subjects who were asked to describe something about a face that would aid them in 
recognizing it later were not significantly more accurate in identification performance, 
compared to those who only looked at the faces or who generated word associates. 
Several subsequent studies supported the view that people who were superior at 
describing faces were not significantly superior at identifying those faces (e.g., Goldstein, 
Johnson, & Chance, 1979; Wolfskiel & Brigham, 1985).  
However, other studies have in fact found a relationship between description 
accuracy and subsequent identification accuracy. Wells (1985) postulated that the 
aforementioned studies failed to find a relationship between prior description and 
subsequent identification for methodological reasons; these studies tended to use only a 
single stimulus face, as they were designed to test solely whether people who are good 
describers are also good at identification. According to Wells, however, some faces are 
easier to describe and easier to identify than others; if so, then we would expect a 
description-identification relationship to appear when multiple target faces were used as 
stimuli. Each of the participants in Wells’ study viewed one of 88 different target faces in 
one of two profiles (either straight-on pose or three-quarters profile). Following a filler 
task, they were asked to describe the face, after which they were given another filler task 
and were subsequently asked to identify each of the faces among sets of photographs that 
either contained the original faces or not. The results showed a significant correlation 
between witnesses’ description accuracy and their identification accuracy. Wells 
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explained his results as suggesting that faces that are better described are also better 
identified.  
Other studies in the eyewitness literature have taken another approach by 
examining the legal community’s general belief that inconsistent testimony is diagnostic 
of inaccuracy (Fisher & Cutler, 1995; Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, 2010; Gilbert & Fisher, 
2006). The specific aim of these studies was to empirically examine the relationship 
between consistency and accuracy of witnesses’ memory reports in a context where 
accuracy could be objectively assessed. In simple terms, are inconsistent witnesses any 
less accurate than consistent witnesses? For instance, Fisher and Cutler (1995) conducted 
experiments which employed the following basic procedure: One or more confederates 
intruded and interrupted an ongoing class and stole an object of value. The incident lasted 
between 30 – 150 seconds, after which participants (student-witnesses) were initially 
asked to describe the intruder via a questionnaire or with an interactive interview format 
(Day 1). Several days later (Day 2), witnesses were asked again for a description of the 
intruder. Immediately after giving a second description, participants were shown lineups 
and asked to identify the intruder. The results showed that inconsistencies in the 
description of the perpetrator between Day 1 and Day 2 were not related to description 
accuracy or to lineup identification accuracy, nor was there any sizable correlation 
between description accuracy and identification accuracy. 
Using a different paradigm, Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond, and Luszcz (1999) 
showed participants a video clip of a robbery crime scene and informed them that they 
were to be subsequently interviewed as witnesses to the crime depicted in the video. 
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After viewing the video, the participants completed an hour-long filler activity. The 
participants were immediately interviewed in either a free-response or forced-response 
format for the first time after completing the activity. Two weeks later, they were 
interviewed for the second time, again in either a free-response or forced-response 
format. The authors showed that overall consistency across interviews was not predictive 
of overall accuracy. In addition, the accuracy of statements with regards to a specific 
dimension of testimony (e.g., the suspect’s appearance) was not related to accuracy with 
regards to another dimension of testimony (e.g., the suspect’s actions). 
The aforementioned studies reveal two important findings that are relevant for the 
purposes of the present study: (a) there was no correlation between consistency and 
accuracy; and more importantly (b) there was no correlation between accuracy on one 
dimension of testimony and accuracy on another dimension of accuracy. More 
particularly, suspect description accuracy was not related to suspect identification 
accuracy. A question left unaddressed by these studies, however, is whether the accuracy 
of witnesses’ descriptions for objects is related to their later facial identification accuracy. 
Thus, one of the principal aims of the present study is to examine whether there is a 
relationship between object description accuracy and facial description accuracy. In other 
words, would a witness’s accuracy/inaccuracy on memory for objects present at the crime 
scene (for instance a get-away vehicle) be related to the witness’s accuracy/inaccuracy on 
facial identification?  
These prior findings suggest that there would be little correlation between 
description of objects and facial identification, especially if recall is an independent 
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process from recognition. It is however recognized that faces are processed differently 
than objects; in particular, people are poor at describing faces (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). 
This could result in a lack of variability in face descriptions across witnesses, accounting 
for small description-identification correlations. If, however, people are generally better 
at describing objects (thus increasing variability across participants in their ability to 
describe objects), we may expect to find a significant relationship between object 
description and face recognition. And given that attorneys often discredit witnesses’ 
facial identifications by pointing out inaccuracies in their description of objects, this 
question also has strong applied value. 
Memory Processing for Faces versus Non-facial Objects 
Researchers in the face processing literature often claim that people generally 
spend a greater amount of time looking at faces than at other stimuli; while there is still 
some contention as to whether innate face processing exists, developmental research 
exploring this topic has suggested the existence of a special cognitive processing system 
for faces that begins during infancy (Pascalis & Kelly, 2009). For instance, a number of 
studies have demonstrated that newborn infants show a preference for human faces over 
other types of visual stimuli (e.g., Johnson, Dziuarawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991). 
Additionally, from an evolutionary perspective, an organism’s survival may depend on its 
ability to process faces in order to differentiate between in-group and out-group 
members, and to detect potential threats. In fact, evidence shows that most species are 
capable of face processing at an early stage of evolution, given that this ability is 
fundamental to their survival (Pascalis & Kelly, 2009). Furthermore, for the purposes of 
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sexual reproduction, species rely on their ability to individuate different faces when 
choosing potential mating partners. Therefore, evolution suggests that people may be 
oriented primarily towards faces, compared to other stimuli.  
It is necessary to examine the issue of memory processing for faces and objects 
within the context of memory research. Most crime scenes are composed of multiple 
types of details that require encoding by witnesses. For instance, an armed robbery crime 
scene may involve information about the suspect’s identity as well as other non-suspect 
related information such as the color of nearby houses or cars, or even a weapon. This 
raises a question as to whether the face of the suspect in this situation would be visually 
processed in a different manner than the objects would. In fact, a plethora of studies have 
argued in favor of the uniqueness of faces because they are recognized using visual 
processing mechanisms that are different from those involved in recognizing other 
objects (Reed, Stone, Bozova, & Tanaka, 2003). 
 At the basic level, facial recognition involves holistic or configural processing of 
facial features, which simply means that we process and recognize faces as a unitary 
percept of the components or features of the face (Reynolds & Pezdek, 1992). In other 
words, the individual features of a face and the relations between the features are 
relatively inseparable in terms of how they are processed (Curby & Gauthier, 2007). Face 
recognition relies on holistic processing for the purposes of maximizing sensitivity to 
configural information that constitute a face (Farah et al., 1998). For instance, memory 
for a face part has been shown to be much better in the context of the original whole face, 
than when presented alone, a phenomenon referred to as the part-whole effect (Tanaka & 
12 
 
Farah, 1993). Also, according to the composite effect (Young et al., 1987), aligning the 
top half of the face of one individual with the bottom half of the face of another 
individual makes it difficult to correctly identify the top half (McKone & Robbins, 2011). 
In comparison, object recognition is parts-based, where people are able to process and 
recognize individual parts of an object (Bruce & Humphreys, 1994; McKone & Robbins, 
2011; Tovee, 1998). Biederman (1987) argued that objects are recognized based on the 
nature and relative location of their parts, without necessarily encoding the location of the 
parts in relation to the main axis of the object (Bruce & Humphreys, 1994).  
Indeed, holistic processing has long been considered central to accurate face 
recognition. Nonetheless, only a few studies have been able to show a direct empirical 
link between holistic processing and face-recognition ability, with most of the support for 
the relationship mainly being indirect (Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011). In an 
exception to this trend, Richler, Cheung, and Gauthier examined the relationship between 
holistic processing and face-recognition by testing participants’ face-recognition abilities 
on the Cambridge Face Memory Test and on a face-identification task. They showed that 
holistic processing predicted face-recognition ability on both the Cambridge Face 
Memory Test and on the identification task.  
The idea that faces are processed differently than non-face objects has also been 
suggested by several behavioral studies that have examined the inversion effect, which 
has over the years proven to be one of the most significantly robust phenomena in the 
face recognition and object recognition literature (Carey & Diamond, 1994; Reed et al., 
2003; Yin, 1969). Research has shown that faces, compared to objects, are recognized 
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more quickly and accurately in their upright position, but are disproportionally impaired 
by inversion (Carey, 1992; Reed et al., 2003; Yarmey, 1971; Yin, 1969). One explanation 
offered for the face-inversion effect is that inversion disrupts configural processing. 
Considering the importance of the role of configuration of facial features in facial 
recognition, this disruption may account for faces being disproportionately more difficult 
to recognize when inverted than other objects (Farah, Tanaka, & Drain, 1995; Leder & 
Bruce, 2000; Reed et. al., 2003). In addition, neuroimaging evidence has shown that brain 
regions that are activated by inverted faces are different from the regions activated by 
upright faces, and similar to the regions activated by non-facial objects (Haxby et al., 
1999; Reed et al., 2003). This is further indication that inversion impairs the normal 
processing of faces. Additionally, fMRI studies have shown that some face selective 
brain cell areas can respond three times more strongly to within-class discrimination of 
faces than to discrimination of objects such as cars and houses (Kanwisher & Yovel, 
2006; McKone & Robbins, 2011).  
Research has not only shown the existence of inversion effects, but has also found 
these effects to be far more stable for faces than for non-faces. Although inversion effects 
for object identification decreases with repeated trials, large inversion effects remain for 
faces even after multiple viewing practice (McKone et al., 2001; McKone & Grenfell, 
1999). In effect, holistic processing for upside-down faces is virtually impossible even 
after many repeated learning trials (McKone & Robbins, 2011; Robbins & McKone, 
2003). 
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 The research discussed so far has outlined both direct and indirect evidence 
confirming holistic processing for faces, and a lack thereof for individual-level 
recognition of objects. Also, the developmental and evolutionary research discussed 
suggests that people are oriented towards faces in a way that they are not for other 
stimuli. Taken altogether, the evidence suggests that memory processes for recognizing 
faces are different from the processes involved in recognizing objects. In light of this 
difference in processing, it is unclear whether face recognition and object recall are 
associated with one another. In the context of the present study, this means that the 
processes involved in remembering the face of a suspect would differ from the processes 
involved in remembering objects he carried, or the car in which he fled. Nonetheless, 
there is little empirical evidence that speaks to whether a witness’ performance on 
identifying the face of the suspect can be predicted from his or her ability to recall objects 
from the crime scene.  
Influence of Encoding Time  
 Some basic memory research studies that have compared memory performance 
for faces and non-face objects suggest that encoding time is an important variable to 
consider when examining these relationships. (e.g., Eng, Chen, & Jiang, 2006; Wheeler 
& Treisman, 2002). For instance, Tversky and Sherman (1975) presented students with 
60 slides containing images of different objects such as a television, teakettle, etc. Each 
participant was randomly assigned to one of four groups, which determined whether they 
viewed each image for 0.25, 0.50, 1.00, or 2.00 seconds. After the presentation of the 60 
images, participants were then given a test of free recall, and were subsequently asked to 
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participate in a recognition test, in which pairs of images (each stimulus and a distractor) 
were presented and the participants were required to indicate which of the images they 
originally viewed. In line with the authors’ predictions, the results showed that the recall 
and recognition of the images generally improved as exposure time increased.  
 Although Tversky and Sherman (1975) found results showing that encoding time 
significantly improved recognition of visual items, their stimulus consisted of only 
images of objects. However, a number of studies have specifically examined the effect of 
exposure time on the recognition of facial images. In one such study, Ellis, Davies, and 
Shepherd (1977) presented participants with thirty facial images and randomly assigned 
them to one of five exposure duration conditions. Participants viewed the image for 0.25, 
0.50, 1.00, 2.00, or 4.00 seconds. They were then given a recognition test that included 
the addition of thirty new facial images that acted as distractors. Similar to the results 
found in studies that used images of objects, participants’ recognition performance 
improved as the exposure duration increased. A later meta-analysis (Shapiro & Penrod, 
1986) on 128 eyewitness identification and face recognition studies confirmed this 
finding: increased exposure duration reliably improved recognition for faces. Taken 
altogether, these studies examining the influence of exposure duration on recognition 
clearly indicate that the amount of time a witness is able to view a face can be an 
important predictor of identification accuracy. Additionally, the results suggest that the 
improvement in recognition as exposure duration increases is generalizable across 
objects, faces, and possibly other visual images. 
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A few studies have indirectly examined comparative differences in facial 
recognition memory performance and object recognition memory performance. These 
studies typically examine the capacity of the visual short-term memory (VSTM) - which 
refers to a memory component that aids in the processing and remembering of faces and 
objects - and the extent to which it is influenced by the complexity of the items stored, 
and the processing strategy used during encoding. For instance, Curby and Gauthier 
(2007) examined the extent to which the capacity of the VSTM is influenced by the 
encoding of faces versus objects. Curby and Gauthier asked participants to study up to 
five faces and objects (e.g., watches and cars) displayed on a screen. Participants were 
randomly assigned to view the faces and objects for varying lengths of time (0.50 vs. 1.50 
vs. 2.50 vs. 4 seconds). They were subsequently given a recognition test where they were 
presented with a single face and were tasked with deciding whether that face was part of 
the initial faces they viewed. A similar recognition test was administered for the objects. 
According to the results, when participants studied the display image for half a second, 
more objects were stored in VSTM than faces. However, when exposure duration 
increased to 4 seconds, an advantage for faces emerged, such that VSTM capacity for 
faces exceeded that for objects. This advantage was specific only to faces encoded in the 
upright orientation, as those encoded upside-down showed no such advantage. According 
to the researchers, the interaction of VSTM capacity and face orientation suggests that the 
advantage for face VSTM when there is adequate encoding time is due to holistic 
processing. 
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According to Curby and Gauthier (2007), the greater increase in VSTM capacity 
for faces than objects as encoding time increased, may be explained by the differences in 
complexity between faces and objects. Specifically, more time was needed to encode 
faces because they are greater in complexity than objects. This is consistent with findings 
from previous research suggesting that objects of greater complexity require more space 
in VSTM than those of lesser complexity (Eng et al., 2006). Previous studies have also 
shown slower visual search rates for faces compared to other objects, which suggests that 
faces, compared to objects, place a greater burden on encoding mechanisms (Curby & 
Gauthier, 2007; Eng et al., 2006). Therefore, when encoding time is limited, complex 
objects require more time to be encoded into VSTM than less complex objects. With 
sufficient encoding time, however, the influence of complexity on VSTM capacity is 
reduced due to the availability of adequate time for perceptual processing. 
The differential impact of encoding time on object and face memory suggests that 
the relationship between object and face memory will change as a function of encoding 
time. It is important to note as well that many of the past studies focus on memory for a 
single item at a time (e.g., Curby & Gauthier, 2007; Ellis, Davies & Sherpherd, 1977). 
However, actual eyewitnesses in real life situations are exposed to multiple items 
simultaneously within a scene. The influence of encoding time when witnesses are 
exposed to multiple items in a scene could be especially important since there will be 
multiple items necessitating encoding. How might the relationship between object and 
face memory be affected by exposure time? One possibility is that there would be a trade-
off between object and face memory at low encoding times but not at higher encoding 
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times. Essentially, greater memory for one item would come at the expense of memory 
for the other item when encoding time is limited. Based on results from Curby and 
Gauthier’s (2007) study, I predict that there would be an attentional trade-off between 
object and face memory at short encoding times. In more specific terms, this would for 
instance mean that higher recall accuracy on objects should predict lower accuracy on 
facial identifications.  This is due to the complex nature of faces, which may require more 
encoding time, and therefore may draw attention from the object when there is limited 
encoding time. When encoding time increases to the point where complex faces can be 
encoded substantially and thus attention diverted elsewhere, that negative correlation 
should lessen, or may even become positive. If this prediction is true, it means that we 
should be able to predict a witness’ performance accuracy on facial lineups from his or 
her performance accuracy on objects, but only when there is adequate encoding time.  
The objects involved in the mock crime used in the present study include a bag, a 
car, and a weapon. However, much eyewitness research has shown that weapons may 
constitute a special class of objects, whose mere presence may impact memory 
processing of details in a way that the other objects may not. As such, memory for 
weapons is discussed separately. 
Weapon Focus  
A large number of crimes typically involve the use of a weapon either as an 
injury-inflicting tool or as a threat against a victim (Maass & Kohnken, 1989). Over the 
years, an increasing number of studies have examined one of the most central 
characteristics of a crime, namely, the presence of a weapon. Most of the research in this 
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field has directly examined the tendency for the presence of a weapon to impair a 
witness’ ability to subsequently identify a perpetrator, a phenomenon referred to as the 
weapon focus effect (Steblay, 1992).  
There are several reasons why the presence of a weapon could negatively impact 
recognition accuracy. The majority of the studies in the weapon focus literature have 
proffered two main theories to explain the weapon focus effect. The first is the 
arousal/threat hypothesis, which relies on Easterbrook’s (1959) cue-utilization hypothesis 
proposing that attention and arousal interact to determine how we utilize aspects of our 
perceptual environment. According to this hypothesis, arousal decreases the number of 
cues that we can monitor simultaneously. Consequently, when highly aroused, we would 
tend to focus more on the central cues in our environment, to the detriment of peripheral 
cues (Fawcett, Russell, Peace, & Christie, 2013). Applying this idea to weapon focus, the 
arousal/threat hypothesis suggests that when a weapon is present, it will induce a state of 
arousal due to its threatening nature. Consequently, people will focus their attention on 
the source of the arousal, which should lead to heightened memory for central cues such 
as the weapon, at the expense of memory for peripheral cues such as characteristics of the 
suspect (Easterbrook, 1959; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908).  
In contrast to the idea that a high state of arousal will lead to attentional 
narrowing, a second theoretical explanation was proposed based on the idea that it is the 
unusualness of a weapon that draws attention. According to this novelty/unusual item 
hypothesis (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978), a weapon is considered unusual in many 
contexts and is therefore inconsistent with the individual’s mental schema or 
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representation of the scene. For instance, people will not commonly associate a gun or 
knife with a parking lot (versus a shooting range for instance). Therefore, during a gun-
point robbery taking place at a parking lot, a witness is likely to spend attentional 
resources resolving the conflict existing between the weapon and their mental schema 
representing the parking lot. This will result in a detrimental effect for memory for 
peripheral details such as the suspect’s face (Fawcett et al., 2013; Loftus & Mackworth, 
1978).  
Regardless of the theoretical explanation underlying the effect, several empirical 
studies assessing the effect of the presence of a weapon on a witness’s recognition ability 
have found support for the weapon focus effect (Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987; 
Loftus, Loftus, & Meso, 1987; Maass & Kohnken, 1989; Steblay, 1992). For instance, 
Loftus et al. (1987) presented participants with slides showing a customer interacting 
with a cashier in a restaurant. Participants viewed a slide that depicted the customer either 
handing the clerk a check, or pointing a gun at the cashier. Participants were subsequently 
given a recognition task to identify the target (customer). The results showed that 
recognition was poorer when there was a weapon involved, compared to when there was 
a check involved. Importantly, the researchers used a corneal reflection device to track 
the eye movements of subjects. Researchers recorded both the number as well as the 
duration of the eye fixations. Their results provided evidence confirming that eye fixation 
on a weapon distracted from a witness’s attention to other relevant details, thereby 
negatively impacting recognition accuracy. 
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In the most direct test of the weapon focus effect, Cutler, Penrod, and Martens 
(1987) examined the effect of weapon visibility on identification accuracy. In the high 
weapon visibility condition, a gun was displayed throughout the video footage, whereas 
in the low weapon visibility condition the weapon remained hidden (in the perpetrator’s 
pocket) throughout the video footage. Participants were then administered a recognition 
task to identify the perpetrator. Similar to other studies, the results showed a decrease in 
identification accuracy when there was high weapon visibility.  
The aforementioned studies were initially criticized as lacking in generalizability 
to real crime situations, since the participants in the study were uninvolved observers.  
According to this view, since the suspect in these studies was presented in slides or video 
clips, participants in the study were never truly threatened by the presence of a weapon 
like they would have in real crime situations. Maass and Kohnken’s (1989) study 
addressed this concern by adopting an experimental paradigm that used a syringe as the 
weapon. The syringe was a clever and useful way of ethically simulating a weapon that 
most people are likely to find somewhat personally threatening. Participants were 
approached by an experimenter who either held a syringe or a pen. In both conditions, 
half of the participants were told they would be administered an injection whereas the 
other half were given no such information. The authors found that exposure to the syringe 
significantly decreased subsequent recognition of the target from a lineup. 
A meta-analytic study by Steblay (1992) also reviewed twelve different studies 
that addressed the weapon focus effect and found a significant overall difference between 
weapon-present and weapon-absent conditions, such that the presence of a weapon led to 
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a reduction in identification accuracy. In other studies examining the weapon focus 
effect, results showed that participants continue to focus on a weapon even when they 
were explicitly instructed to focus on the target’s face (Tooley, Brigham, Maass, & 
Bothwell, 1987). Collectively, these results indicate that the weapons focus effect is 
relatively robust across variations in experimental variables.  
As discussed earlier, previous research has established that the weapon focus does 
reliably occur when there is a visible, threatening weapon, particularly during crimes of 
short duration. There is, however, no data examining how the weapon focus effect 
depends on encoding time. If the presence of a weapon draws the witness’s attention 
from the perpetrator, we can predict that the effect of a weapon on facial recognition 
accuracy will be greater when encoding time is limited. When there is sufficient encoding 
time, the witness would have adequate time to encode the weapon and possibly encode 
other details.  
The majority of the studies examining the weapon focus effect concentrate mostly 
on its effect on the recognition accuracy of faces. Consequently, there is a paucity of 
research that examines how memory accuracy for objects is influenced by the presence of 
a weapon. Indeed, the few studies that have attempted to expand the examination of the 
effect to include memory accuracy for objects have only assessed participants’ memory 
of perpetrator characteristics such as clothing and facial features (Steblay, 1992). Hence, 
it is difficult to determine whether the presence of a weapon could for instance negatively 
affect a witness’s memory for relevant crime scene objects such as the get-away car used 
by the suspect. One of the goals of the current study is thus to examine whether a weapon 
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negatively influences recognition accuracy for non-face objects. For instance, one 
possibility is that due to the novelty or uniquely arousing nature of the weapon (Maass & 
Kohnken, 1989), its presence results in the weapon drawing attention from the other 
objects. 
Prior research has largely established that weapon presence negatively influences 
identification accuracy. However, previous research is not definitive on whether this 
negative impact is specific to memory for the perpetrator holding the weapon, or whether 
it extends to memory for all faces present during the crime. Due to the fact that the 
present study uses a design involving two perpetrators, there is an opportunity to examine 
the impact of weapon presence in a multi-perpetrator crime situation. This study presents 
an opportunity to investigate whether the presence of the gun would negatively influence 
memory for the face of the co-perpetrator in the crime. Indeed, there is practical value to 
this since witnesses' ability or inability to identify all the perpetrators involved in a multi-
perpetrator crime would have implications for whether a criminal is apprehended or left 
on the streets.  
The real world implications of weapon focus is substantial. It is well established 
that eyewitness testimony is an integral and important aspect many criminal cases, and in 
some cases an eyewitness’s testimony is relied upon to secure a conviction (Fawcett et 
al., 2013). Based on the findings from the weapon focus literature, the present study was 
developed to expand upon the weapon focus effect in a number of important and specific 
ways: (a) to examine whether encoding time moderates the weapon focus effect; (b) to 
24 
 
examine whether there is a weapon focus effect on memory for objects; and (c) to 
examine whether weapon focus effect applies to a perpetrator not holding the gun.  
Attentional Framework  
The review of past literature led to the development of a theoretical framework 
which shapes the present study’s predictions, and may explain potential findings. This 
framework, which I term the “attentional competition” framework (ACF), is based on the 
idea that when people encounter a scenario containing multiple elements, those elements 
compete with each other for our attentional resources. Due to the limitations of our 
attentional resources, how we expend those valuable attentional resources would be 
influenced by various factors, one of which is encoding time. As previously discussed, 
past literature on memory processing for faces versus objects suggests the likelihood that 
people are more oriented towards viewing faces, compared to other visual stimuli. 
Therefore, in a scenario involving people and objects, faces should immediately draw 
attentional resources, followed by unusual or arousing objects (such as a weapon), finally 
followed by usual objects. Relating this framework to the present study, the amount of 
time available to a witness to simultaneously encode details should influence memory 
performance differentially for faces and objects. If a greater amount of attentional 
resources are immediately devoted to encoding faces, we should expect there to be 
heightened memory for face recall or recognition, at the expense of object recall or 
recognition. This should result in no correlation (or a negative correlation) between 
object description accuracy and face identification accuracy at short encoding times. 
However, when there is adequate encoding time available, an individual has sufficient 
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time to focus attention on the objects after first encoding face details. Thus, we would 
expect to see larger description-accuracy correlations for longer encoding times. 
Furthermore, according to the ACF, weapons draw attention before other objects 
do. Consequently, detrimental effects of weapon presence on memory for other details 
should be greatest when there is limited time available to encode information. When there 
is limited encoding time, attentional resources may be spent on the weapon, resulting in 
poor memory for objects at short encoding times. When there is adequate encoding time 
however, attentional resources can be diverted to non-weapon objects. Therefore, the 
weapon focus effect should be smaller at long encoding times. Further, because faces and 
weapons should be immediately capture attention, an increase in encoding time should 
benefit memory for objects more than memory for faces and weapons. Based on the 
framework discussed above, I next outline the specific hypotheses of the present study. 
The Present Study 
Are there relationships between recognition and recall accuracy of faces, and 
recognition and recall accuracy of objects? This primary research question is core to the 
aims of the present study. There are at least two possible ways for such a relationship to 
occur. First, accuracy on one item (object) may be positively correlated with accuracy on 
the other item (face), if memory performance on these two items is generally reflective of 
the underlying quality of a witness’s overall memory. Indeed, this viewpoint is 
fundamental to the legal strategy of undermining a witness’s credibility on one item by 
pointing out his or her prior inaccuracy on another item. Second, accuracy on these two 
items could be negatively correlated if increased attention for one object (thereby likely 
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resulting in greater accuracy) is related to decreased attention for the other (thereby 
resulting in lesser accuracy). This outcome would essentially rebut the aforementioned 
legal strategy of undermining a witness’ credibility using prior inaccuracy. Based on the 
attentional competition framework, I hypothesize that the relationship between memory 
for a face and memory for an object will be dependent on encoding time: when encoding 
time is limited, the competition for attention among stimuli will result in attention being 
given to faces (rather than objects), resulting in no (or even a negative) correlation 
between memory for faces and memory for objects. However, when encoding time is 
increased, attention can be diverted to objects, thus resulting in a reduced (or eliminated) 
negative correlation. 
Based on the attentional competition framework, I hypothesize that witnesses’ 
facial identification accuracy will be significantly greater when there is no weapon 
present, compared to when a weapon is present, and that this weapon focus effect will 
occur for both the person holding the weapon and the person not holding the weapon. 
Furthermore, according to the ACF, attention will be diverted to weapons before other 
objects. Thus, I predict that there will be a weapon focus effect on objects when encoding 
time is limited (and thus there is a competition for attention). However, at longer 
encoding times, attentional competition is lessened and attention can be diverted to other 
objects; thus, I predict that the weapon focus effect will be reduced (or even eliminated) 
at longer encoding times. If this prediction is true, it would imply that the weapon focus 
effect may be neutralized when there is adequate time available for witnesses to encode 
information.  
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Finally, the design of the present study, which involves both recall and 
recognition tests for faces and objects, allows us to address a secondary issue: The 
accuracy of eyewitness identifications from object lineups. A very small handful of 
studies have examined the utility of non-traditional lineups in addition to the typical 
facial lineups pervasively adopted by investigators. For instance, Pryke, Lindsay, Dysart, 
and Dupuis (2004) investigated the use of multiple lineups to identify a target. The 
authors presented participants with facial, body, voice, and clothing lineups after 
watching a scene. The results showed that multiple identifications of the suspect by a 
witness from the different independent lineups were highly diagnostic of the suspect’s 
guilt, suggesting that non-face lineups have diagnostic value. However, this research has 
examined only items related to the suspect (clothes, voice, or body); there is little to no 
research examining whether objects not related to the suspect contain diagnostic value. 
Indeed, there is practical value to examine the usefulness of object lineups. Often times, a 
crime may involve the use of several objects, some of which may be central to the 
particular crime. The identities of such objects may be important for the purposes of the 
work of law enforcement officials. In real cases for instance, it is of enormous benefit if a 
witness can correctly identify central elements of a crime such as the gun or vehicle used 
by a perpetrator during the commission of a crime. Further, this study also allows for a 
comparison of witnesses' object lineup identification accuracy and their object 
description accuracy. This ultimately allows us to determine whether object lineups 
provide any beneficial value, which could be useful for the purposes of law enforcement 
investigations.  
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In summation, the hypotheses of the present study, predicted by the attentional 
competition framework, are as follows: (a) when encoding time is limited, there will be 
an attentional trade-off between facial encoding and object encoding, resulting in a 
negative correlation between memory for faces and memory for objects; (b) when 
encoding time is increased, this negative correlation will be reduced or eliminated; (c) the 
weapon focus effect will generalize to objects; (d) the weapon focus effect would be 
moderated by encoding time, such that there will be a negative impact on memory 
accuracy for faces and objects when encoding time is limited, compared to when there is 
adequate encoding time; and (e) identifications of objects from object lineups will contain 
diagnostic value. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants in the study consisted of 736 undergraduate students at Florida 
International University, recruited through SONA systems. Twenty-three participants 
were excluded from analysis due to incomplete responses, resulting in a final total of 713 
participants. All participants received extra credit as compensation for their participation.  
Materials 
Stimulus image. The stimulus image is a picture depicting the crime scene, which 
was created specifically for this study. Using a picture instead of a video ensured that all 
the objects and faces in the scene were exposed for the same amount of time within the 
scene. Additionally, using a picture instead of a video also enabled the experimenter to 
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control the angle at which the items were captured and presented on screen to the 
participant. The picture showed the two perpetrators (male and female), a bag, and a 
vehicle all in one shot. For stimulus sampling purposes (Wells & Windschitl, 1999), four 
versions of the stimuli materials were used (weapon vs no weapon; targets A vs targets 
B). Targets A consisted of two perpetrators, a bag, and a car that differed completely 
from the ones used as targets B; otherwise the scenes were identical. The weapon was 
treated as both a dependent variable (tested for recall or recognition as are the other 
objects) and an independent variable (its presence manipulated). There were no other 
faces or distinct objects included in the shot in order to ensure that the only faces and 
objects shown in the picture were that of the perpetrators and objects intended for recall 
and recognition accuracy testing. The stimulus image was presented on desktop 
computers and laptops in a laboratory setting. Participants in the short encoding condition 
were exposed to the image for 5 seconds, whereas those in the long encoding condition 
were exposed to the image for 20 seconds. This study adopted a basic procedure that is 
consistent with several previous studies that have used pictures or slides as stimulus 
materials (e.g., Tooley et al, 1987), and manipulated encoding time using comparable 
time frames (e.g., Curby & Gauthier, 2007) prior to testing witnesses’ memory. 
Lineups. To select the photographs used in constructing the lineups, two people 
were asked to independently view the stimulus image and provide specific descriptions of 
the characteristics of each person and object. A list of the most common descriptors for 
each item was subsequently compiled. Examples of common descriptors for the 
perpetrators included “male,” “dark hair,” “Hispanic,” “long hair”, “tall,” and “average 
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build” etc. Examples of common descriptors for the objects included “sedan”, “black 
car”, “backpack”, “bag with a logo”, “kitchen knife”, and “hand gun” etc. The list of 
common descriptors was subsequently given to a different set of two people, who looked 
through a set of twenty photographs for description matches. The seven most selected 
photographs (including the photograph of the actual perpetrator or target object) were 
used to construct the lineups. Two types of line-ups were created. Target absent (TA) 
lineups consisted of six members (fillers), none of which was the perpetrator or target. 
These fillers matched the description of the perpetrator. The target present (TP) line-up 
consisted of a six-member line-up, with the perpetrator included as a member of the line-
up replacing one of the six fillers. TP and TA lineups involving the objects seen in the 
video were also created in the same manner as those involving faces. Therefore, for 
example, a six-item TP lineup included the actual bag seen in the video in addition to five 
fillers matched to description, whereas the corresponding TA lineup consisted of six bags 
that were all fillers. Pilot data were collected for the purpose of choosing a designated 
innocent suspect from the foils in each target absent lineup. Participants in the pilot test 
viewed the stimulus image and were subsequently asked to select the lineup member they 
thought was the perpetrator or the target object they saw. The lineup member chosen the 
most became the designated innocent suspect. 
Questionnaire. A questionnaire was created to test participants’ recall of the 
objects and faces seen in the video. Participants were asked both open-recall as well as 
closed-ended, cued-recall type of questions. In the open-recall questionnaire, participants 
were given the following instruction: “Describe everything you saw in the photo image 
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that you were presented with earlier. Specifically, your task is to describe the information 
in the photo in a way such that it would aid someone else in identifying the items. 
Remember to describe all the information in as much detail as possible.’ Examples of the 
cued-recall questions included: ‘What is the color of the bag?’, ‘What is the color of the 
hair of the male suspect?’, ‘What is the race of the female suspect?’ etc.  Responses on 
the questionnaire were subsequently coded to determine accuracy.  
Filler task. Participants were given a filler task that simply involved solving a 
maze puzzle. This task was timed to last for about a minute. Participants were given the 
filler task at two points. Each participant was given the first maze immediately after 
viewing the stimulus picture and before answering the open-ended and cued recall 
questions. The second maze was presented immediately after answering those questions 
and prior to completing the lineup identification task.  
Procedure 
The study was designed using Qualtrics survey tools and the entire study was 
completed on a computer. Participation in the study took place in a computer lab at the 
Modesto Maidique Campus at Florida international University. Participants were 
randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (weapon vs no weapon) X 2 (Target A vs Target 
B) X 2 (encoding time: long vs. short) between subjects design. Participants were also 
randomly assigned to view target-present and target-absent lineups for each of the 
lineups. Upon arrival, each participant was assigned a computer on which all stimuli were 
presented. After signing the consent form and agreeing to participate in the study, each 
participant was randomly assigned to an experimental condition. The basic procedure, 
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which all participants followed, entailed viewing the stimulus image first for either 5 
seconds or 20 seconds, depending on condition. These exposure times were chosen based 
on the exposure times used in previous studies examining memory for single items within 
a scene (e.g., Curby & Gauthier, 2007). All participants were then given the first filler 
task which was a maze puzzle timed to last for approximately one minute. Afterwards, 
they were given a questionnaire asking them to describe items and faces seen in the 
image in as much detail as possible. Questions included both open-ended descriptions of 
the scene as well as directed questions towards specific objects. Participants were then 
presented with the second filler task, which was also a different maze puzzle timed to last 
for approximately one minute. Subsequently, they were presented with facial and object 
lineups for identification decisions. Each randomly assigned participant was given 
multiple lineups, testing the participant’s memory for the two faces, and each of the 
objects. With regards to the facial lineups, each participant was randomly assigned to 
either a TP lineup or a TA lineup. Similarly with regards to each of the non-weapon 
object lineups (i.e., car and bag), all participants were given either a TP lineup or a TA 
lineup. Those in the weapon condition were randomly assigned to a TP or TA weapon 
lineup in addition.   
Due to the fact that participants are asked to describe the faces and objects before 
they are asked to identify them in a lineup, there is a concern as to whether the results of 
the study could be affected by the verbal overshadowing effect, which refers to the 
detrimental effect of verbal description on subsequent face recognition (Finger & Pezdek, 
1999). Previous research has shown that the verbal overshadowing effect can be reduced 
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or even eliminated under some circumstances. For instance, Finger and Pezdek showed 
that inserting a delay between verbal description and facial identification significantly 
reduced the verbal overshadowing effect. It is partly for this reason that a filler task was 
given to participants after the description task and prior to the lineup identification task.  
There were four factors manipulated between-subjects. These factors include the 
target stimuli (Targets A or B), the presence of a weapon (weapon present or weapon 
absent), stimulus encoding time (short or long), and the nature of the various lineups (TA 
or TP). In keeping with the procedure used in previous studies, participants were not 
given specific information about the length of time they will be exposed to the stimulus 
image. There were vaguely informed that the image “may be displayed for only a few 
seconds.” After providing their recall and lineup identification responses, all witnesses 
were given a questionnaire assessing other testimony-relevant measures such as their 
confidence levels. Participants were then debriefed and dismissed. 
Results 
Coding and Scoring 
A detailed coding scheme was developed to score the accuracy of participants’ 
responses to the open-ended and cued-recall questions. A unit of information is defined 
as any piece of information that in and of itself can be useful to an investigator’s work. 
Responses were scored into the following categories: Accurate (any correct unit of 
information), Inaccurate (any wrong unit of information), Don’t remember (responses 
such as “I can’t remember” or “I forgot”), Don’t know/Not sure (responses such as “I 
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don’t know” or I am not sure”), Unscorable (any information of little meaningful value to 
an investigator, and hence cannot be scored), and Total (total sum of the units of 
information).  
In the accurate category, a score of 1 was awarded for every unit of information 
that was deemed to be correct. For instance, if the participant stated that “there were two 
people and a black car,” a score of 1 was awarded for “two,” “people,” “black,” and “car” 
(assuming these responses were correct). The number of accurate units was then summed 
up, thereby resulting in a total of 4 accurate units for that particular participant. Similarly, 
in the inaccurate category, a score of 1 was awarded for each inaccurate unit of 
information provided by the participant, the sum of which was calculated to determine 
the total number of inaccurate units for a particular participant. For example, if the 
participant stated that “there were three people and a blue car,” then it was scored as 2 
inaccurate units, and 2 accurate units. The total number of units of information in this 
instance would be 4 (the sum total of the accurate plus inaccurate units). A similar 
scoring protocol was applied in scoring the remaining categories, with 1 point tallied for 
each “don’t remember,” “don’t know/not sure,” or “unscorable” unit.  
An overall accuracy rate score for each participant was computed by summing up 
the number of accurate units, and dividing by the total number of units (accurate + 
inaccurate). Similarly, the overall inaccuracy rate of a participant was defined as the sum 
of the total number of inaccurate units, divided by the total number of units. Therefore, if 
a participant provided 2 correct units of information and 2 inaccurate units of 
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information, the accuracy rate would be 2/4 or 0.50, and the inaccuracy rate would also 
be 2/4 or 0.50. 
Reliability of scoring was assessed by having two blind independent raters score 
the responses of 72 participants (approximately 10 percent of the total sample), each of 
whom had given complete responses to all the questions and were randomly selected 
across the different conditions. For each participant, the two raters’ scores for the 
responses were compared, and a reliability score was calculated.  Across the 72 
participants, the interrater reliability score (Cronbach’s alpha) was 0.99 for number of 
accurate units (range = 0.99 – 1.00), 0.93 for number of inaccurate units (range = 0.87 – 
1.00), 0.80 for number of “Don’t remember” responses (range = 0.70 – 1.00), 0.82 for 
number of “Don’t know/Not sure” responses (range = 0.70 – 1.00), 0.92 for number of 
unscorable units (range = 0.85 – 1.00), and 0.99 for total number of units (range = 0.99 – 
1.00).  
Encoding Time 
 The following set of analyses focus on examining the influence of encoding time 
on facial identification accuracy, facial description accuracy, object identification 
accuracy, and object description accuracy. The various proportions are illustrated in 
Table 1. 
Influence of encoding time on facial identifications. There was no significant 
difference in a witness’ likelihood of making a correct identification from a target-present 
lineup when encoding time was 5 seconds (M = 0.42, SD = 0.45, N = 269), compared to 
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when encoding time was 20 seconds (M = 0.46, SD = 0.46, N = 268), t(535) = 1.04, p = 
0.30, d = 0.09. 
Among witnesses who viewed a target absent lineup, there was no significant 
difference in a witness’ likelihood of correctly rejecting the lineup when encoding time 
was 5 seconds (M = 0.49, SD = 0.47, N = 267), compared to when encoding time was 20 
seconds (M = 0.56, SD = 0.47, N = 265), t(530) = 1.77, p = 0.08, d = 0.15. 
Influence of encoding time on object identifications. Witnesses were 
significantly less likely to make a correct identification of objects when encoding time 
was 5 seconds (M = 0.51, SD = 0.40, N = 269), compared to when encoding time was 20 
seconds (M = 0.71, SD = 0.38, N = 264), t(531) = 5.75, p < .01, d = 0.50. 
Witnesses were also significantly less likely to correctly reject the lineup when 
encoding time was 5 seconds (M = 0.56, SD = 0.40, N = 272), compared to when 
encoding time was 20 seconds (M = 0.68, SD = 0.39, N = 269), t(539) = 3.75, p < .01, d = 
0.32.  
Influence of encoding time on facial descriptions. Witnesses’ facial description 
accuracy when they were allowed 5 seconds of encoding time (M = 0.72, SD = 0.17, N = 
359) did not significantly differ from when they were allowed 20 seconds of encoding 
time (M = 0.74, SD = 0.15, N = 354), t(711) = 1.01, p = 0.31, d = 0.08. 
Influence of encoding time on object descriptions. Witnesses’ object 
description accuracy was significantly less when encoding time was 5 seconds (M = 0.69, 
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SD = 0.21, N = 359), compared to when encoding time was 20 seconds (M = 0.74, SD = 
0.21, N = 354), t(711) = 3.20, p < .01, d = 0.24. 
Overall, these results show that an increase in encoding time from 5 to 20 seconds 
had beneficial effects for object identification and object description accuracy, but not for 
facial identification and facial description accuracy. These results are consistent with the 
attentional competition framework, which predicts that attention is drawn first to faces 
and then only subsequently to objects if there is enough time. Thus, the ACF predicts, 
and current results show, that increased exposure time should primarily benefit object 
memory as opposed to face memory.  
Predicting Witnesses’ Lineup Identification Accuracy from their Descriptions  
 Overview. Various correlational analyses were performed to examine the 
relationships between object descriptions, object identifications, facial descriptions, 
quantity of information, and facial identifications. Since participants saw a different 
number of target present and target absent lineups due to random assignment, the facial 
identification accuracy score was calculated separately for target present and target 
absent lineups by taking the average sum of the witness’ accuracy scores on the male and 
female lineups. First, I examine the correlation between overall description accuracy 
(accuracy of open-ended recall provided by witness), overall object description accuracy, 
overall facial description accuracy and facial identification accuracy for both target 
present and target absent lineups. Subsequently, I examine the correlation between 
overall description quantity, overall facial description quantity, overall object description 
quantity and facial identification accuracy. These correlations are illustrated in Table 2. 
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Throughout this section, z-tests are used to examine whether differences in encoding time 
affected the magnitude of these correlations. 
Overall description accuracy. Witnesses’ overall description accuracy 
significantly predicted their likelihood of making a correct lineup identification of the 
targets, r(535) = 0.15, p < .01. However, encoding time did not moderate this effect, z = 
0.24, p = 0.81.  
Witnesses’ overall description accuracy did not predict their likelihood of 
correctly rejecting a target-absent lineup, r(530) = -0.01, p = 0.86. Encoding time did not 
moderate this effect, z = -0.11, p = 0.91. 
Overall object description accuracy. Witnesses’ overall object description 
accuracy significantly predicted a witness’ overall likelihood of making a correct lineup 
identification of the targets, r(535) = 0.09, p = 0.03; however, encoding time did not 
moderate this effect, z = 1.29, p = 0.19.  
 Witnesses’ overall object description accuracy did not predict a witness’ 
likelihood of correctly rejecting a target-absent lineup, r(531) = 0.04, p = 0.39; however, 
encoding time did moderate this effect, z = 0.46, p = 0.65.  
Overall facial description accuracy. Witnesses’ overall facial description 
accuracy significantly predicted their likelihood of making a correct lineup identification 
of the targets, r(535) = 0.08, p = 0.05. Encoding time did not moderate this effect, z = 
0.35, p = 0.73.  
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Witnesses’ overall facial descriptive accuracy did not predict their likelihood to 
correctly reject a target-absent lineup, r(530) = 0.02, p = 0.62. Encoding time did not 
moderate this effect, z = 0.34, p = 0.73.   
Overall description quantity. The amount of overall descriptive information 
given significantly predicted a witness’s likelihood of making a correct identification, 
r(535) = 0.13, p < .01. Encoding time did not moderate this effect, z = 0.35, p = 0.73.  
The amount of overall descriptive information significantly predicted a witness’s 
likelihood of correctly rejecting a target-absent lineup, r(530) = 0.10, p = 0.02. Encoding 
time did not moderate this effect, z = 0.69, p = 0.49.   
Facial description quantity. The overall amount of facial descriptors given did 
not significantly predict a witness’s likelihood of making a correct lineup identification of 
the targets, r(535) = 0.05, p = 0.27. Further analyses showed that encoding time did not 
moderate this effect, z = 0.35, p = 0.73.   
The overall amount of facial descriptors did not significantly predict a witness’s 
likelihood of correctly rejecting a target-absent lineup, r(530) = 0.07, p = 0.10. Encoding 
time did not moderate this effect, z = 0.23, p = 0.82.   
Object description quantity. The amount of overall object descriptive 
information did not significantly predict a witness’s likelihood of making a correct lineup 
identification of the targets, r(535) = 0.03, p = 0.47. Encoding time did not moderate this 
effect, z = 0.46, p = 0.65.  
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The amount of overall object descriptive information marginally predicted a 
witness’s likelihood of correctly rejecting a target-absent lineup, r(530) = -0.08, p = 0.06. 
Encoding time did not moderate this effect, z = -0.93, p = 0.35. 
In summary, the various correlational analyses reveal that description accuracy 
and quantity had either no predictive abilities for facial identification accuracy, or at best 
very weak predictive abilities, accounting for approximately 1.5% of the variance in 
accuracy, and that this was not moderated by encoding time.  
Weapon Focus Effect 
 The next set of analyses focus on the weapon focus effect. Specifically I examine 
whether the presence of a weapon significantly influenced facial identification accuracy, 
facial description accuracy, object identification accuracy, and object description 
accuracy. Subsequently, I examine whether the weapon focus effect is influenced by 
encoding time.  
It should be noted that for the purposes of these overall analyses, I collapsed 
across all target faces, and also collapsed across all target objects in order to examine 
overall facial description and identification accuracy, as well as overall object description 
and identification accuracy. Nonetheless, I also present the various identification 
accuracy proportions separated by each target across weapon presence, encoding time, 
and lineup type conditions. These proportions are illustrated in Table 3. 
Facial lineup identifications. Consistent with the weapon focus effect, witnesses 
who viewed a target present lineup were significantly more likely to correctly identify the 
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target when there was no weapon (M = 0.49, SD = 0.47, N = 270), than when a weapon 
was present (M = 0.39, SD = 0.44, N = 267), t(535) = 2.50, p = .01, d = 0.22. Further 
analyses revealed that the size of this weapon focus effect on identification accuracy did 
not vary significantly based on which of the two targets held the weapon, t(265) = 0.16, p 
= .91, d = 0.02. 
Among witnesses who viewed a target absent lineup, there was no significant 
difference in correct rejection of the lineup when there was no weapon (M = 0.53, SD = 
0.47, N = 266), compared to when a weapon was present (M = 0.53, SD = 0.47, N = 266), 
t(530) = 0.00, p = 1.00, d = 0.00. 
Object identifications. There was no significant difference between correct 
identifications on objects when there was no weapon (M = 0.60, SD = 0.40, N = 266), 
compared to when a weapon was present (M = 0.62, SD = 0.40, N = 267), t(531) = 0.64, p 
= .52, d = 0.06.  
Among witnesses who viewed a target absent lineup, there was no significant 
difference between correct rejection of the lineup when there was no weapon (M = 0.61, 
SD = 0.39, N = 270), compared to when a weapon was present (M = 0.63, SD = 0.40, N = 
271), t(539) = 0.42, p = .68, d = 0.04.  
Facial descriptions. Witnesses were significantly less accurate in describing the 
targets’ faces when a weapon was present (M = 0.71, SD = 0.17, N = 362), compared to 
when a weapon was not present (M = 0.75, SD = 0.15, N = 351), t(711) = 3.31, p < .01, d 
= 0.25. 
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Object descriptions: There was no significant difference in object description 
accuracy when a weapon was present (M = 0.70, SD = 0.20, N = 362), compared to when 
there was no weapon (M = 0.73, SD = 0.21, N = 351), t(711) = 1.63, p = .10, d = 0.12. 
Influence of encoding time on the weapon focus effect. One of the key 
questions the present study examines is whether the amount of time available to a witness 
to encode information influences the weapon focus effect. As shown in Table 3, the 
weapon focus effect was found for the Male B target. Therefore, logistic regression 
analysis was conducted to examine whether the weapon focus effect found for that target 
from target present lineups was moderated by encoding time. Identification accuracy was 
regressed onto weapon presence, encoding time, and the interaction between these two 
variables. The regression model was statistically significant, χ2 (1) = 8.93, p < .01, and 
explained 6.6% of the variance, R² = .07. The results showed that there was a marginally 
significant interaction between encoding time and weapon presence, χ2 (1) = 3.44, p = 
.06, β = 1.19. There was a significant main effect of encoding time, χ2 (1) = 3.76, p = .05. 
Generally supporting the hypothesis that the presence of a weapon would have a more 
negative impact on accuracy when encoding time is limited, compared to when there is 
adequate encoding time, the results showed that the weapon focus effect occurred when 
participants viewed the image for 5 seconds, χ2 (1) = 7.69, p < .01, but was eliminated 
when they viewed the image for 20 seconds, χ2 (1) = 0.05, p = .83. 
Overall, these results support the firmly established prediction that the presence of 
a weapon negatively impacts correct identification for faces. This effect occurred 
regardless of which target held the weapon. Additionally, encoding time moderated this 
43 
 
effect such that there was a weapon focus effect when participants were allowed 5 
seconds of encoding time, but not when they were allowed 20 seconds of encoding time, 
consistent with predictions from the ACF. According to this model, at short encoding 
times, the witness’s attention is drawn by both the weapon and the faces and he/she must 
encode the details in a limited amount of time; the weapon competes with the faces for 
attentional resources, resulting in a weapon focus effect. However, as encoding time 
increases, this competition decreases and adequate attentional resources can be allocated 
to both the faces and the weapon, resulting in an elimination of the weapon focus effect. 
The hypothesis that the weapon focus effect would generalize to objects, however, was 
not supported.   
Diagnosticity  
In addition to standard face lineups, the present study also examined witnesses’ 
accuracy on various object lineups. The present study’s integration of object lineups 
(consisting of car lineups, bag lineups, and weapon lineups) provides the opportunity to 
examine the extent to which responses to these lineups can provide useful information.   
One way to quantify the amount of information contained from a given lineup is 
to calculate its diagnosticity, which indexes the extent to which a target identification is 
indicative of that target’s guilt or innocence. Specifically, diagnosticity values calculate 
the likelihood that an identified target is the actual perpetrator, rather than an innocent 
target (Wells & Lindsay, 1980). In the context of the present study, diagnosticity 
estimates similarly provide information about the likelihood that an identified object (car, 
bag, or weapon) is the actual object the witness saw, rather than a filler object. 
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Diagnosticity is especially valuable when comparing lineup procedures to determine 
superiority in probative value (Wells & Olson, 2002; Charman & Wells, 2007). The 
diagnosticity estimate of a suspect or target identification is calculated as the ratio of the 
target identification rate from target present lineups to the false alarm rate from target 
absent lineups. A diagnosticity value of 1 indicates that an identified target is equally 
likely to be guilty as innocent; as values get larger, a target identification is more likely to 
indicate the suspect’s guilt. Thus, the greater the diagnosticity, the more information a 
suspect identification provides to a trier of fact. Diagnosticity of target identifications for 
the various lineups was calculated across encoding time conditions and compared via z-
tests (see Wells & Olson, 2002). 
Diagnosticity of car identification responses. Among participants who were 
allowed an encoding time of five seconds, diagnosticity of a car identification was 5.89, 
meaning that a witness was 5.89 times more likely to correctly identify the target car 
when it is in the lineup, than to identify a filler when it was not in the lineup. When 
encoding time increased to twenty seconds, diagnosticity of a car identification increased 
to 12.5, meaning that a witness was 12.5 times more likely to correctly identify the target 
car in a target present lineup, than identify a filler in a target absent lineup.  
Subsequent analyses conducted to examine whether encoding time significantly 
influenced diagnosticity of the car identification revealed that increased encoding time 
significantly increased the diagnosticity of the car identification, z = 2.9, p < .01. In other 
words, a car identification provided more information after a long exposure compared to 
a short exposure. 
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Diagnosticity of bag identification responses. Among participants who were 
allowed an encoding time of five seconds, diagnosticity of a correct identification was 
1.8. When encoding time increased to twenty seconds, diagnosticity of a correct 
identification increased to 3.75. Subsequent analyses revealed that increased encoding 
time significantly increased the diagnosticity of the bag identification, z = 2.35, p = .02. 
Diagnosticity of male suspect identification responses. When participants were 
allowed an encoding time of five seconds, diagnosticity of a correct identification was 
3.17. When encoding time increased to twenty seconds, diagnosticity of a correct 
response increased to 4.89. Subsequent analyses revealed that encoding time did not 
significantly change the diagnosticity of the identification, z = 1.05, p = .29. 
Diagnosticity of female suspect identification responses. As encoding time 
increased from five seconds to twenty seconds, diagnosticity of a correct identification 
increased from 5.5 to 7. Subsequent analyses revealed that encoding time did not 
significantly change the diagnosticity of the identification, z = 0.65, p = .52. 
Diagnosticity of weapon identification responses. As encoding time increased 
from five to twenty seconds, diagnosticity of a correct identification increased from 1.17 
to 1.38 respectively. Subsequent analyses revealed that encoding time did not 
significantly change the diagnosticity of the identification, z = 0.8, p = .42. 
It should be noted that the diagnosticity analyses above were computed by 
collapsing across the male targets, female targets, bags, cars, and weapons. However, I 
also calculated diagnosticity estimates separately for each of the targets, as illustrated in 
46 
 
Table 4. With the exception of one of the male targets, the diagnosticity analyses 
generally followed the same pattern. Overall, the diagnosticity analyses showed that both 
object and suspect identifications have diagnostic value, and diagnosticity of the object 
identifications generally increased with an increase in encoding time. This suggests that 
the identification responses received from object lineups benefits from an increase in 
time. This finding is consistent with the attentional competition framework, which 
predicted that increased exposure time should be particularly likely to result in greater 
memory for objects compared to faces or weapons, since attention would be initially 
captured by faces and weapons at short encoding times, and only diverted to objects with 
further encoding opportunity.  
Information Gain Analyses 
 In order to determine the extent to which we can update our knowledge about a 
correct target identification based on witnesses’ response, information gain analyses were 
conducted, which are derived from a Bayesian statistical analysis (see Wells & Olson, 
2002). There are two factors that determine the information gained from a lineup 
decision. The first is the diagnostic value of the decision (obtained from the diagnosticity 
ratios reported above), and the second is the likelihood of the suspect’s guilt prior to 
knowing how a witness performed on an identification task (often referred to as the prior 
probability). Specifically, information gain is determined by examining the difference 
between the prior probability of guilt and the posterior probability of guilt (i.e., the 
probability of the suspect’s guilt after learning about the witness’s identification 
response).  
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 Because the prior probability of the suspect’s guilt is not known, information gain 
curves were created that graph the information gained from a lineup identification as a 
function of the prior probability, consistent with prior research (Charman & Cahill, 2012; 
Wells & Olson, 2002). The amount of information gained was calculated for target 
identifications for the male, female, car, bag, and weapon targets, and are illustrated in 
Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5, respectively. 
 Among witnesses who were allowed 5 seconds of encoding time, information 
gain associated with the knowledge that a witness correctly identified the male suspect 
peaked at approximately 0.28 (at a prior probability of approximately 0.35). When 
participants were allowed 20 seconds of encoding time, information gain associated with 
the knowledge that a witness correctly identified the male suspect peaked at 
approximately 0.29 (at a prior probability of approximately 0.35). 
 Among witnesses who were allowed 5 seconds of encoding time, information 
gain associated with the knowledge that a witness correctly identified the female suspect 
peaked at approximately 0.40 (at a prior probability of approximately 0.30). When 
participants were allowed 20 seconds of encoding time, information gain associated with 
the knowledge that a witness correctly identified the female suspect peaked at 
approximately 0.45 (at a prior probability of approximately 0.30). 
Among witnesses who were allowed 5 seconds of encoding time, information 
gain associated with the knowledge that a witness correctly identified the car target 
peaked at approximately 0.42 (at a prior probability of approximately 0.30). When 
participants were allowed 20 seconds of encoding time, information gain associated with 
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the knowledge that a witness correctly identified the car target peaked at approximately 
0.56 (at a prior probability of approximately 0.20). 
Among witnesses who were allowed 5 seconds of encoding time, information 
gain associated with the knowledge that a witness correctly identified the bag target 
peaked at approximately 0.15 (at a prior probability of approximately 0.45). When 
participants were allowed 20 seconds of encoding time, information gain associated with 
the knowledge that a witness correctly identified the bag target peaked at approximately 
0.32 (at a prior probability of approximately 0.35). 
Among witnesses who were allowed 5 seconds of encoding time, information 
gain associated with the knowledge that a witness correctly identified the weapon peaked 
at approximately 0.04 (at a prior probability of approximately 0.50). When participants 
were allowed 20 seconds of encoding time, information gain associated with the 
knowledge that a witness correctly identified the weapon peaked at approximately 0.08 
(at a prior probability of approximately 0.45). 
Discussion 
The present study reveals a few main findings. First, the various correlational 
analyses showed that overall, the accuracy and quantity of a witness’s descriptions of the 
crime scene had little or no predictive abilities with regards to facial identification 
accuracy. At best, the results indicated very weak predictive abilities, accounting for 
approximately 1.5% of the variance in identification accuracy. This was not moderated 
by encoding time. Second, the presence of a weapon, as predicted, negatively affected 
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facial description accuracy and the correct identification rate on facial lineups. Further, 
the deleterious effect of the presence of a weapon was limited to face identification and 
descriptions; the weapon did not negatively affect either object description accuracy or 
object identification accuracy. Third, there was a moderating effect of encoding time on 
the weapon focus effect such that the weapon focus effect occurred when participants had 
limited encoding time, but not when they had adequate encoding time. Fourth, encoding 
time significantly influenced object description and object identification accuracy, but did 
not affect facial description and facial identification accuracy. Finally, both object and 
facial identifications were of diagnostic value; the diagnostic values of object 
identifications increased with an increase in encoding time, whereas the diagnostic values 
of face identifications did not significantly increase with an increase in encoding time. 
One of the questions this study sought to specifically examine was whether a 
witness’s memory for various stimuli in a crime scene – faces, weapons, and objects – 
were related to one another, and whether any such relationship is influenced by the 
amount of time available to a witness to encode information. During the course of 
investigating a crime, witnesses are typically asked to describe objects or environments, 
and rarely asked to identify them. Similarly, witnesses are usually shown a lineup for the 
purposes of identifying a perpetrator. While the results generally showed that there was 
no substantial relationship between facial identification and description accuracy or 
quantity, a key line of inquiry involved specifically examining the relationship between 
accuracy on object descriptions and facial identification accuracy. Our results do not 
provide empirical support for the idea that witnesses’ lineup identifications of a target can 
50 
 
be discredited by their inaccuracy on object descriptions. This is important as a 
relationship between object description and facial identification is often assumed by 
attorneys; results of the current study undermine this assumption. 
Drawing from the attentional competition framework, it was hypothesized that 
there would be an attentional trade-off resulting in little (or a negative) correlation 
between accuracy on objects and accuracy on faces at short encoding times, but that 
longer encoding times would result in a positive relationship. In actuality, the results 
showed that witnesses’ accuracy on object descriptions did not predict their facial 
identification accuracy. Further analyses showed that encoding time also had no effect on 
the relationship.  
There are both theoretical and empirical reasons that can explain the lack of a 
substantial relationship between description accuracy and identification. Logically, 
whether accuracy on describing objects is correlated with accuracy on identifying a 
suspect from a lineup depends on the extent to which processing of the two events is 
independent; if the processing is independent, then there should be little to no relationship 
(Fisher and Cuervo, 1983; Brewer et al., 1999). For instance, Fisher and Cuervo (1983) 
showed that memory for two different dimensions (gender of a speaker and language of 
presentation) of a spoken message were independent of each other. Participants in the 
gender-relevant condition were told that two males (male English speaker and male 
Spanish speaker) were litigating against two females (female Spanish speaker and female 
English speaker) over a piece of land in contention. The other participants in the 
language-relevant condition were told that two Spanish speaking people (male and 
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female) were litigating against two English speaking people (male and female). All 
participants were then asked to listen to a courtroom hearing tape and decide who was 
entitled to the piece of land. A subsequent memory test found that gender features were 
better recalled than language features in the gender-relevant condition, whereas language 
features were better recalled than gender features in the language-relevant condition. This 
finding dovetails with the finding by Brewer et al. (1999) also showing that witnesses’ 
description accuracy on a suspect’s appearance was not correlated with their accuracy on 
a suspect’s actions. 
Overall, the results showing a lack of substantial relationships between object 
description accuracy or quantity and facial identification accuracy is consistent with the 
idea that faces are processed differently than non-face objects, as suggested in previous 
literature (e.g., Curby & Gauthier, 2007; Reynolds & Pezdek, 1992). These studies argue 
that faces are unique because they entail visual processing mechanisms that differ from 
objects. Hence in the context of the present study, it is logical that there would be little to 
no association between object description and facial identification for instance. Similarly, 
we can examine the findings from the perspective of recall and recognition, given that the 
underlying process for descriptions is recall, whereas the underlying process for 
identifications is recognition. As Hollingworth (1913) notes, the primary distinction 
between recall and recognition is that the former requires the retrieval of contextual, 
specific details of an encounter, whereas the latter depends on a more subjective sense of 
a previously encountered detail. Thus, recall and recognition seem to rely on cognitive 
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processes that are independent of each other, and this can account for the lack of a 
relationship between description accuracy and identification accuracy.  
Nonetheless, the finding of a lack of substantial relationships between description 
and identification accuracy is practically important from the perspective of an 
investigator or a juror assessing a witnesses’ credibility at trial. From an investigator’s 
perspective, the fact that a witness’s accuracy on describing objects from a crime scene is 
not strongly correlated with his/her identification accuracy indicates that the investigator 
can pursue a suspect identified by the witness, even though he/she had been previously 
inaccurate on describing objects present at the crime scene. In essence, the overall 
usefulness of information provided by a witness would be preserved and investigators 
could rely on aspects of the witness’s account that have not been determined to be 
inaccurate. For the purposes of assessing a witness’s credibility in the courtroom, this 
finding suggests that jurors should not necessarily discount a witness’s subsequent lineup 
identification based solely on the fact that the witness was shown to have been inaccurate 
in describing an object relevant to the crime scene. Indeed, educating jurors about the 
lack of a substantial relationship between description accuracy and identification 
accuracy could be useful for their assessment of a witness’ overall credibility in the 
courtroom.   
The present study also examined the influence of weapon presence on description 
and identification accuracy. The results showed a weapon focus effect; the presence of a 
weapon decreased facial identification accuracy and facial description accuracy. This 
finding is consistent with previous research showing that weapon presence negatively 
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affected both identification accuracy and recall accuracy (see Steblay, 1992). Indeed, the 
weapon focus effect has been consistently demonstrated to be robust across several 
experimental manipulations. Furthermore, results indicate that the weapon focus effect is 
not limited to the target holding the weapon; the weapon harmed face identification 
accuracy even when a different person was holding the weapon. This is one of the very 
few studies to address this question, as most other studies use only a single perpetrator 
event.  
The presence of a weapon did not however affect either object description 
accuracy or object identification accuracy. This finding is consistent with the attentional 
competition framework, in which the eyewitness’s attention is first drawn to faces and 
weapons; when encoding time is limited, attention is thus divided between these features, 
resulting in a weapon focus effect. But as encoding time increases, attention can be 
diverted to other objects (in this case a bag and a car). Note that this explanation explains 
all of the following observed results: (a) the weapon focus effect was found for faces but 
not objects (since object encoding never competes with weapon encoding); (b) the 
weapon focus effect was eliminated at long encoding times (since the witness had 
sufficient time to encode both the faces and the weapon); and (c) increasing encoding 
time improves recognition of objects but not faces (since faces were primarily encoded 
immediately). 
One of the theoretical explanations for the weapon focus effect - the “unusual 
item hypothesis.” The unusual item hypothesis states that it is more difficult to process 
scenes that include a weapon or unusual object than scenes that do not. Consequently, the 
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weapon would draw significant attentional resources, to the detriment of memory for the 
other aspects of the scene (Steblay, 1992; Fawcett, Russell, Peace, & Christie, 2013). An 
unusual object has been defined in previous weapon focus literature as any object that 
may be considered unexpected in the context in which it was presented. For example, 
Pickel (1998) used a whole raw chicken, and found that there was a negative effect on 
accuracy for witnesses who saw the chicken, compared to those who did not.   
Given that the weapon focus effect can be influenced by the amount of attentional 
resources devoted to encoding particular details, it follows logically that the amount of 
time a witness is allowed for encoding would play a similarly influential role. 
Surprisingly, very few studies within the weapon-focus literature have explicitly 
manipulated encoding time to examine its influence on the weapon focus effect. 
Exploring the influence of encoding time on the weapon focus effect allows us to (a) test 
predictions of the attentional competition framework, and (b) examine whether the effect 
diminishes with an increase in encoding time, which has strong practical implications. 
The present study’s results revealed that the weapon focus effect found for facial 
accuracy was moderated by encoding time. Supporting the hypothesis, the weapon focus 
effect occurred when participants viewed the image for 5 seconds, but did not occur when 
participants viewed the image for 20 seconds. The implication of this finding in the real 
world is that the duration of a crime or the amount of time available to a witness to 
encode information during the crime can significantly impact the witness’ vulnerability to 
the weapon focus effect. From a practical perspective, this finding suggests the possibility 
that a weapon focus effect in real cases diminishes with increased encoding time.  
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Another main finding of the present study was that encoding time influenced 
object description and identification accuracy, but failed to influence facial description 
accuracy or identification accuracy. This finding contradicts the Curby and Gauthier 
(2007) study which found a greater increase in visual short term memory (VSTM) 
capacity for faces than objects as encoding time increased. The authors asserted that more 
time was needed to encode faces because they are greater in complexity compared to 
objects. In addition to Curby and Gauthier’s study, other studies (see Eng et al., 2006) 
also found slower visual search rates for faces compared to objects, and asserted that 
faces placed a greater burden on encoding mechanisms, compared to objects. Therefore, 
from the perspective of these studies, an increase in encoding time should have had 
beneficial effects for memory for faces. There is, however, a key difference that may 
explain the apparent discrepancy between these studies. Earlier studies tested memory for 
faces and objects separately, and as such there was no attentional competition. In 
contrast, the present study presented a scene in which both objects and faces were present 
simultaneously, and witnesses’ attention could be drawn by either faces or objects. The 
present study’s attentional competition framework suggests that faces and objects would 
compete for attentional resources, and it is likely this competition for attentional 
resources that explains the current findings. In line with previous literature suggesting 
that people are more oriented towards faces than objects, witnesses’ attention was first 
drawn to the faces, to the detriment of memory for objects especially when encoding time 
is limited. With adequate encoding time however, people were able to encode objects as 
well, meaning that an increase in encoding time was more beneficial to memory for 
objects compared to faces.  
56 
 
Diagnosticity and information gain analyses revealed that participants recognized 
objects from lineups at a rate greater than chance, particularly with increased encoding 
time. This indicates that object identification contains diagnostic value; in fact, the 
observed informational value of some object identifications was even greater than that 
contained in suspect identifications. This means that law enforcement officials could 
possibly derive useful information by asking witnesses to identify crime-related objects 
such as a car from a lineup, in instances where getting description information is difficult. 
For instance, a traumatized victim or witness to a crime may have a harder time 
describing an ordeal in detail, but may be more comfortable pointing out a crime-relevant 
object from a lineup. Although it is uncommon for law enforcement to administer object 
lineups, results suggest they may be beneficial if even used merely as a supplementary 
tool to complement object description accounts provided by a witness. This is a 
potentially very important finding, and warrants future research. 
There are a few limitations with regards to the present study. For instance, 
although a weapon focus effect was found for overall face identification, it should be 
noted that this effect was only found for one of the target faces when results were 
analyzed separately for each target. The exact reason for this finding is unclear. However, 
a speculative but plausible explanation is that the faces for which the effect was not found 
may have been less complex compared to the face for which the effect was found, leading 
to the possibility that it may have been easier to encode those faces. Indeed, as shown in 
Table 3, the hit rates for the three targets (Male A, Female A, and Female B) were all 
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slightly higher than the hit rate for the target for which the weapon focus effect was found 
(Male B).  
Although there is support for the view that the weapon focus effect diminishes 
with encoding time, this result was found when using only two encoding time periods (5 
seconds versus 20 seconds). It is consequently difficult to know if the results could be 
replicated using even longer encoding time periods. The reason why such a line of 
inquiry may be useful is that there is a possibility that there is a basic time threshold at 
which a witness can adequately encode details, and thereby diminish the influence of 
weapon presence. Consequently, beyond that threshold, increasing encoding time may 
not have much of an effect. Given the paucity of empirical research that explicitly 
manipulates encoding time, future research is needed to examine the extent to which this 
finding can be generalized across various encoding time manipulations. This can be 
ascertained empirically by future research adopting a wide range of encoding time 
intervals to examine this issue.  
Although the results show that object lineups provide diagnostic value, it is 
difficult to ascertain the extent to which this finding is generalizable. For instance, it is 
difficult to know whether the usefulness of object lineups generalizes across all types of 
objects, or whether it is specific to certain types of objects. Additionally, there is for 
instance no way to determine whether witnesses would perform similarly on object 
lineups involving objects with which they are familiar, compared to objects with which 
they have little familiarity. Future research should continue to probe the usefulness and 
generalizability of objects lineups by examining a wide range of relevant objects. 
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Furthermore, we know many manipulations that affect the accuracy of facial 
identifications (e.g., pre-lineup instructions, filler selection, etc.). A relevant question 
then is whether these same manipulations affect object identifications as well, and future 
research may wish to examine this. 
In conclusion, the present study has both theoretical and practical implications. 
Theoretically, the results are generally consistent with the attentional competition 
framework, a novel model describing how eyewitnesses allocate attentional resources. 
This model successfully predicted the effects of differing encoding time on memory for 
faces, objects, and the weapon focus effect. Nonetheless, it failed to account for the lack 
of an effect of encoding time on description-identification correlations. Future research 
should further develop this model. 
From a practical perspective, the current study’s results are useful to law 
enforcement, judges, attorneys, and jurors. For investigators, knowing that there is a lack 
of substantial relationship between description accuracy and identification accuracy 
enables them to resist discounting aspects of a witness’ information solely due to prior 
inaccuracy on another aspect. For jurors and judges, such information provides a 
framework through which they can evaluate a witness’ credibility in the courtroom. 
Furthermore, the results from the present study shed light on the practical implications of 
the weapon-focus effect. Knowledge about how the weapon focus effect is influenced by 
factors such as encoding time for instance enables jurors or judges to make thorough 
evaluations of testimony in cases involving a weapon. Educating jurors and judges on 
these issues will enable them to ask critical questions about eyewitness memory when 
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assessing witness credibility in the courtroom. Ultimately, this would inure to the benefit 
of the legal system. 
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Table 1 
 
Target-Present and Target-Absent Identification Accuracy Proportions for Facial 
identifications, Object identifications, Facial descriptions, and Object descriptions as a 
function of Encoding Time. 
                                                                                    
                                                                                 Encoding Time 
                                                                      5 Seconds              20 Seconds                                                  
 
Target-Present 
 
 Facial identifications                            0.42                         0.46 
 
 Object identifications                           0.51                         0.71** 
 
 
Target-Absent 
 
Facial identifications                            0.49                          0.56 
 
Object identifications                           0.56                          0.68** 
 
Descriptions 
 
Facial descriptions                                0.72                          0.74 
 
Object descriptions                               0.69                          0.74** 
Note: **p < .01 
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Table 2 
 
Bivariate Correlations between Identification Accuracy and Overall Description 
Accuracy, Facial Description Accuracy, Object Description Accuracy, Overall 
Description Quantity, Facial Description Quantity, and Object Description Quantity for 
Target-present and Target-absent Lineups. 
                                                                                    
                                                                  Target-Present                       Target-Absent 
                                                           Identification Accuracy        Identification Accuracy                          
 
Overall description accuracy                            0.15**                                   -0.01 
 
Facial description accuracy                              0.08                                        0.02 
 
Object description accuracy                             0.09*                                      0.04 
 
Overall description quantity                             0.13*                                      0.10* 
 
Facial description quantity                               0.05                                        0.07 
 
Object description quantity                              0.03                                       -0.08 
Notes: *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
68 
 
Table 3 
 
Identification Accuracy Proportions of Specific Targets across Weapon Presence, 
Encoding Time and Lineup Type Conditions. 
 
              Weapon           No Weapon    Overall 
                                                
          TP       TA                TP            TA             TP           TA           
 
5 seconds condition 
 
Male A         0.33          0.50             0.48           0.60            0.40         0.55 
Female A         0.48          0.48             0.47           0.43            0.47         0.46 
Car A          0.51          0.53             0.47           0.59            0.49         0.56 
Bag A                                 0.28          0.43             0.24           0.39            0.26         0.41 
Male B                               0.22          0.47             0.50           0.49            0.35         0.48 
Female B                           0.37          0.31             0.45           0.54            0.41         0.42 
Car B                                 0.60          0.63             0.54           0.64            0.57         0.63 
Bag B                                0.28          0.40             0.26           0.48            0.27         0.44 
          
20 seconds condition 
 
Male A         0.42          0.72             0.49           0.74           0.46         0.73 
Female A         0.52          0.51             0.57           0.51           0.55         0.51                              
Car A          0.61          0.68             0.75           0.65           0.68         0.67 
Bag A                                 0.43          0.61             0.45           0.60           0.44         0.61 
Male B                               0.41          0.50             0.43           0.57           0.42         0.53 
Female B                           0.43          0.60             0.42           0.35           0.43         0.47 
Car B                                 0.83          0.65             0.81           0.69           0.82         0.67 
Bag B                                0.51          0.56             0.41           0.61           0.46         0.58 
 
Overall 
 
Male A        0.37          0.61             0.48           0.67           0.43         0.64 
Female A        0.50          0.50             0.52           0.47           0.51         0.49 
Car A         0.56          0.52             0.61           0.62           0.59         0.62 
Bag A                                0.36          0.52             0.35           0.50           0.36         0.51 
Male B                              0.31          0.48             0.47           0.53           0.39         0.51 
Female B                          0.40          0.41             0.44           0.45           0.42         0.45 
Car B                                0.72          0.64             0.68           0.67           0.70         0.65 
Bag B                               0.40          0.48             0.34           0.55           0.37         0.51 
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Table 4 
 
Diagnosticity Estimates for each Target as a Function of Encoding Time 
                                                                                    
                                 5 seconds                  20 seconds                     Difference (sig.)                                     
 
Male A                         3.30                            9.20                          z = 1.90 (p = .03)* 
 
Female A                     3.92                            5.50                          z = 1.15 (p = .13) 
 
Car A                           4.45                           11.33                         z = 2.90 (p = .00)** 
 
Bag A                          5.20                           11.00                         z = 2.15 (p = .02)* 
 
Weapon A                   1.30                            2.03                          z = 1.30 (p = .10) 
   
Male B                        3.18                            3.23                           z = 0.40 (p = .34) 
 
Female B                    8.20                            10.75                         z = 0.50 (p = .31) 
 
Car B                          7.13                            11.71                         z = 3.00 (p = .00)** 
 
Bag B                         1.13                             2.30                          z = 2.45 (p = .01)** 
 
Weapon B                  1.11                             1.19                          z = 0.33 (p = .37) 
Notes: *p < .05, **p < .01 
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Figure 1. Information gain from identification of male suspect for when encoding time is 
5 seconds versus when encoding time is 20 seconds. 
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Figure 2. Information gain from identification of female suspect for when encoding time 
is 5 seconds versus when encoding time is 20 seconds. 
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Figure 3. Information gain from identification of a target car for when encoding time is 5 
seconds versus when encoding time is 20 seconds. 
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Figure 4. Information gain from identification of a target bag for when encoding time is 5 
seconds versus when encoding time is 20 seconds. 
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Figure 5. Information gain from identification of a target weapon for when encoding time 
is 5 seconds versus when encoding time is 20 seconds. 
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